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1. Introduction
When corporate insiders trade their company’s stock, how much do they profit?   What
kinds of stocks offer the greatest profits?  Are high-volume trades more profitable than low-
volume trades?  What is the expected cost to “outsiders” due to possible transactions with
insiders?
In this paper, we answer these questions using a comprehensive sample of reported
insider transactions from 1975 to 1996.   The principal innovation in our approach is the
construction of value-weighted portfolios comprised of all insider trades.  This portfolio-based
approach applies performance-evaluation methods to analyze the returns of insiders’ trades from
the day they are executed.  These methods provide answers to new questions and offers fresh
insights into old ones.
By law, corporate insiders must file monthly SEC reports about their trades in their
company’s stock, and these reports are quickly made public.1  This data on insider trading has
inspired a large academic literature that studies the cross-sectional variation of stock returns as a
function of insider-trading activity.  Representative articles include Lorie and Niederhoffer
(1968), Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe
(1990), and Lakonishok and Lee (1998).2  This literature focuses on the abnormal returns to
firms depending on the “intensity” of insiders’ purchases and sales over well-defined periods.
For example, a stock may be labeled an “insider buy” for a month if at least three insiders bought
the stock and no insiders sold it.  Alternatively, the definition may rely on the net number of
shares purchased and sold by insiders during the month.  We refer to such rules as “intensive-
                                               
1 Section 2 discusses the definition of a corporate insider, and the regulation and reporting requirements of their
trades.
2 A closely related literature that studies insiders’ ability to forecast the time-series of aggregate stock returns, a
topic we do not discuss in this paper.  See Seyhun (1988), (1992), and (1998), and Lakonishok and Lee (1998).4
trading” criteria.  These studies use a variety of intensive-trading criteria for many different
samples, and are nearly unanimous in the conclusion that stocks that are intensely bought tend to
outperform relevant benchmarks over a subsequent period, and that those that are intensely sold
tend to underperform.    They provide mixed evidence on whether other investors can profit, after
transactions costs, by using the public information contained in the insider trading reports.
Seyhun (1998) summarizes this evidence and concludes that several different trading rules lead
to profits.
The research cited above can be interpreted as tests of both the “strong” and “semi-
strong” versions of the efficient-markets hypothesis.  If, for example, intensively purchased
stocks earn abnormal returns, then this would be evidence against the strong form.  If outsiders
can use the public filings of insiders to construct successful trading strategies, then this would be
evidence against the semi-strong form (Fama, 1971).  While intensive-trading criteria illuminate
the efficient-markets hypothesis, the approach encounters two challenges.  First, the requirement
that intensity be defined over some interval means that stocks are only classified after these
intervals end.  Therefore, the returns on the days immediately following most trades are not
included in the analysis.   Second, the use of individual stocks as the main unit of analysis makes
it impossible to determine a value-weighted return to all trades; the stocks with intensive buying
or selling activity may comprise a small or a large part of overall trading.  Attempts to overcome
these challenges by using event-study methods on daily returns for all trades (Pascutti, 1996)
encounter statistical difficulties due to both cross-sectional correlation and biases in computing
long-run abnormal returns.3
                                               
3 See Barber and Lyon (1997), Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1998), and Kothari and Warner (1997).5
In this paper, we surmount these difficulties by adopting a value-weighted portfolio-
based approach.  We imagine that all insider purchases are placed into a portfolio on the day that
they are made and held for exactly one year.   This “purchase portfolio” is like a shadow mutual
fund “managed” by the combination of all insiders.  Since the holdings in this portfolio are
weighted in proportion to the values of the underlying insider trades, the returns on the portfolio
would correspond to the value-weighted returns earned by all insider purchases over one year.
Similarly, we can imagine a “sale portfolio” comprised of all shares sold by insiders, with these
shares held in the portfolio for exactly one year.
We use these constructed purchase and sale portfolios to assess the timeliness of insider
transactions.  For some purposes, we might prefer instead to calculate the actual profits that
insiders make from their purchases and sales.  Unfortunately, this is not possible: we have no
way to determine the actual holding period for insider purchases.  For sales, there may be no
equivalent to a holding period, since a restorative purchase may never be made.  Bearing such
difficulties in mind, we employ a one-year holding period for the stocks that insiders buy, and
calculate hypothetical insider profits from purchases on this basis. Thus, we are arbitrarily
defining “profits” to be “abnormal returns earned in the one-year period from date of
acquisition”.  We say that the purchase portfolio earns a profit if its returns exceed a relevant
benchmark portfolio; in this case insiders are profiting by being in their own stock instead of the
benchmark for the one-year period from date of acquisition.  In parallel fashion, we say the sale
portfolio “profits” if its returns fall below those of its relevant benchmark portfolio; with the sale
portfolio, insiders are profiting by investing in the relevant benchmark instead of their own stock
for the one-year period following date of sale.6
These constructed purchase and sale portfolios allow for a novel perspective on insider
profits, made possible by two useful methodological devices.  First, daily updating of the
portfolios allows us to include all stocks’ immediate post-trade performances in the analysis.
Second, the returns to the purchase and sale portfolios can be analyzed using performance-
evaluation methods and are free of the statistical difficulties that plague long-horizon event
studies.  Another advantage of the value-weighted portfolio approach is that it allows simple
decompositions of the portfolios by time horizon, firm characteristics, and trading volume.  By
constructing subportfolios, we can obtain point estimates and standard errors for the abnormal
returns to value-weighted insider trades conditional on each of these elements.
Beyond the scientific benefits, our estimation of insider profits is also motivated by
policy concerns: What are the welfare implications of the profits to insider trading?  There is a
range of opinion.4  Some laissez-faire observers believe that insider trading should be legal, and
that profits from it should be part of corporate compensation.  At the opposite extreme, financial
Puritans would object to the insiders’ profits as unjust enrichment, even if there were no
consequences for market (or corporate) performance.5
Lying in between is the position of American regulators, whose principal concern must
be whether the playing field is level:  Profitable insider trading is bad as a symptom of markets
that are unfair to the outside investor, who is trading at an informational disadvantage.  This is
unfair in itself, and furthermore undermines outsiders’ confidence in such markets, diminishes
their willingness to trade, and thereby reduces liquidity and efficiency within financial markets.
The regulators’ market-performance concern depends on perceptions of market fairness, not
                                               
4  See Bainbridge (1998) for a survey of this debate.
5 Their disapproval would not vanish, even if it could be demonstrated that insider trading brought significant net
benefits, say because it brought stock prices more firmly into alignment with appropriate values.  Their historical
ancestors objected to bear-baiting, not because of the suffering of the bear, but because of the pleasure of the people.7
necessarily reality.  It is virtually impossible for outsiders to assess their disadvantage in such
markets, absent the detailed analysis to which we now turn.
  Two other studies employ variants of the portfolio approach used in our paper.  Finnerty
(1976) uses the CAPM to evaluate the equally weighted returns to all insider trades in NYSE
stocks from 1969 to 1972.  Though equal weighting is reasonable for his study, which is
motivated as a test of the strong form of market efficiency, it leaves open the same questions as
do studies based on intensive-trading criteria.  Eckbo and Smith (1998) use performance-
evaluation methods on monthly data for the complete sample of value-weighted insider holdings
in Norway from 1985 to 1992.  In contrast to the results on U.S. data, they find that insiders do
not earn abnormal returns.  The difference between their results and those for the U.S. may stem
from differences in a variety of institutional and methodological sources.  This is further
motivation for a study of insider trading in the U.S. using our portfolio approach.
Overall, our evidence shows that insiders profit from their purchases but not from their
sales. In raw returns, the purchase portfolio outperforms the market by about 7.4 percent per
year.  Using several performance-evaluation methods, we find that about one-third of this
outperformance can be explained by insiders’ propensity to buy small stocks, “value” stocks, and
those with higher market betas.  Across the different methods, the remaining abnormal
performance ranges between 37 and 47 basis points per month.  These point estimates are similar
to those found in studies that use intensive-trading criteria. We find that about one-sixth of these
abnormal returns accrue within the first five days after the trade, one-third within the first month,
and three-quarters within the first six months.
Despite the economically significant profits to insider purchases, we find that
counterparties (“outsiders”) have little to fear from these reported transactions.  Insider trades8
make up but a tiny portion of the market.  On a value-weighted basis, insider purchases make up
only about 0.03 percent of total market volume, so the expected “cost” to outsiders due to the
purchases of insiders is about 0.15 basis points per year.6
In raw returns, the sale portfolio has about the same performance as the value-weighted
market.  Consistent with previous studies, we find that insiders tend to sell “growth” stocks that
have performed well in the recent past.  When we use performance-evaluation methods and
control for this tendency, all methods yield abnormal returns that are both economically and
statistically insignificant.  This result differs from the literature on insider trading, where most
studies find negative abnormal returns for stocks that are intensely sold by insiders.  Our use of
value weighting, as opposed to some intensity measure, is the most likely cause of this
difference.  We also document a significant positive abnormal return for the first five days after
sale transactions.  We provide evidence to show that this anomaly is caused by market-
microstructure effects following high-volume sales.
Following our analysis of the purchase and sale portfolios, we look at the portfolios
decomposed along several dimensions: volume of the trade, size of the firm, insider’s position in
the firm, and whether the trade is executed directly for an insider or indirectly for another party.
These categories have previously been studied using intensive-trading criteria or event-study
methods to study market efficiency and to search for profitable trading rules based on the public
filings of insiders.7  Our goals are different.  We ask, “how much do insiders profit?” from each
type of trade. We find that several of the results from intensive-trading studies do not extend to
our framework.   For example, we find that insiders in small firms do not earn significantly
                                               
6 Details of this calculation are provided in Section 4.
7 See Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Pascutti (1996), Lakonishok and Lee (1998).9
higher profits than do insiders in large firms, and top executives do not earn significantly higher
profits than do other insiders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and provides summary
statistics.  Section 3 describes the three performance-evaluation methods we employ.  Section 4
gives the performance-evaluation results for the main insider-purchase and insider-sale
portfolios.  Section 5 analyzes decompositions of the purchase and sale portfolios by trade
volume, firm size, and the insider’s relationship to the firm. The conclusion summarizes our
results and puts them in context.
2. Data and Summary Statistics
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) prohibits agents from trading securities
while in possession of material inside information.  “Material insider information” can be loosely
defined as private information that a reasonable investor would consider important in the
decision to buy or sell a corporation's security.8  The enforcement of the SEA was substantially
strengthened by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988.  In response, many companies instituted their own restrictions on
insider trading to avoid any appearance of illegality.9  Do current restrictions and enforcement
measures prevent corporate insiders from trading profitably?  That is the motivating question of
this paper.
To facilitate enforcement of the regulations, Section 16(a) of the SEA requires that open-
market trades by corporate insiders be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) within ten days after the end of month in which they took place. For the purposes of this
                                               
8 For a detailed discussion of the SEA, see Bainbridge (1998).
9 Jeng (1998).10
reporting requirement, “corporate insiders” include officers with decision-making authority over
the operations of the company, all members of the board of directors, and beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of the company’s stock.  These reports, filed on the SEC’s “Form 4”, are
the source of data for almost all of the empirical studies of insider trading.10 Our data is drawn
from these Form 4 filings for the period from January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1996.  These
filings contain information about each transaction and about the insider’s relationship to the firm.
(See Appendix A for more information about Form 4.)
Our analysis focuses on open-market purchases and sales by officers and directors.  We
exclude options exercises, private transactions, and all transactions by beneficial owners. The
resulting database contains 563,863 transactions from 1975 to 1996, of which 214,897 are
purchases and 348,966 are sales.11    Sales outnumber purchases particularly in later years when
option and stock awards began to become a significant part of officers’ and directors’
compensation; such awards do not show up as purchases, but they do show up as sales when the
positions are liquidated.  The typical sale is substantially larger than the typical purchase, with
average dollar values of $136,260 per sale as compared with $35,580 per purchase.
On a value-weighted basis, what percentage of all trades are made by insiders?  This
percentage is straightforward to calculate as the dollar volume of insider purchases and sales
divided by the dollar volume of all trades.  We calculate these percentages separately each month
for both purchases and sales, and we plot the time-series of these percentages in Figure 1.  Over
the whole sample period, the average monthly ratio of value-weighted insider sales to all trades
is 0.22 percent.  Thus, an outsider making a purchase would expect 0.22 cents per dollar to be
                                               
10 Two exceptions are Meulbroek (1992), who studies illegal (and unreported) insider trading, and Gompers and
Lerner (1998), who study venture capital distributions.
11 We performed several steps to purge the data of coding errors.  See Appendix A.11
with insiders.  The average monthly ratio of insider purchases to all trades is 0.03 percent.  Thus,
outsiders making sales would expect only 0.03 cents per dollar from insiders.
Many studies of insider trading show that insiders sell stocks after they rise and buy them
after they fall.12 We also see this in our sample, as Figure 2 illustrates.   We calculated an
abnormal return for every trade on every day, where abnormal returns are defined as the stock’s
return minus the return on the value-weighted market (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq).  Cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are measured relative to the trading day by adding the daily abnormal
returns for all intervening days.  These CARs are then averaged across all firms and graphed in
the figure.  Thus, this analysis equally weights all trades beginning on the day of their execution.
Figure 2 shows that, on average, an insider sale is preceded by a positive CAR of about
12 percent over the preceding 100 days, but has no noticeable CAR after the sale.  Purchases are
preceded by a negative CAR of about two percent over the 100 days prior to the trade date, and
are followed by a positive CAR of about six percent over the subsequent 100 days.
The average CARs graphed in Figure 2 provide only a crude measure of the abnormal
returns of insider trades.  Aside from the obvious difficulties of using the value-weighted market
as the expected-return proxy for all stocks, there are also statistical problems due to biases in the
computation of CARs and the cross-sectional dependence of the abnormal returns among
transactions of the same firm and across firms.13  We sidestep these problems by constructing
“purchase” and “sale” portfolios and analyzing their returns with performance-evaluation
methods.  To construct the purchase portfolio, we “buy” all insider purchases at the closing
prices on the day of the actual trades.14  We then hold these shares in the portfolio for one year.
                                               
12 Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1998).
13See Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1998).
14We use closing prices on the day of the trade rather than the actual transaction prices of the insider transaction
because of concerns about errors in the reporting of transaction prices.  Please see Appendix A for a complete
discussion of this issue.12
Thus, the purchase portfolio includes all shares purchased by insiders over the previous year.
Similarly, the sale portfolio contains all shares sold by insiders over the previous year.
  Figure 3 plots the total market value of the purchase and sale portfolios as a fraction of
the overall market.  The series begins on January 1, 1976, so that both the portfolios have a full
year of history at all times.15 As would be expected, the sale portfolio is always larger than the
purchase portfolio.  With all sales held for one year after the insider transaction, the sale portfolio
averages about 0.11 percent of the market.  It is largest in recent years and reaches a peak of 0.23
percent of the market in 1994.  The size of the purchase portfolio averages about 0.02 percent of
the market and does not demonstrate any obvious pattern over time.
 The purchase and sale portfolios are likely to differ along many dimensions. First, we
would expect to observe more insider sales than purchases, if only for diversification and
liquidity motives.  High-ranking corporate officers typically have substantial human capital
invested in their firms and often have large holdings of corporate stock and options relative to
their wealth.16  In addition, much executive compensation comes in the form of stock and
options, and these additions to insiders’ personal portfolios will not show up in our database. In
fact, a value-weighted plot of option exercises (not shown here) shows a striking similarity to the
plot of sales given in Figure 1; such similarity would be expected if many sales are executed in
conjunction with option exercises.  Overall, we would expect that insider purchases are more
likely than sales to be information-driven.
  Second, the purchase and sale portfolios differ from each other and from the overall
market in their stock composition; insiders tend to trade in stocks that are smaller in market
                                               
15 After January 1, 1976, the purchase and sale portfolios will have a full year of transactions in them.  During 1975,
the portfolios will necessarily be truncated as of January 1, 1975.  Therefore, for consistency, we begin all the
analyses of the purchase and sale portfolios on January 1, 1976, and refer to our sample as beginning on that date.
16 Hall and Liebman (1998).13
capitalization than the “average” stock, with this pattern more pronounced for purchases.17 As an
illustration, we compute the fraction of the purchase and sale portfolios made up by the largest
and smallest stocks and we compare these fractions with analogous fractions for the whole
market. These fractions are computed for July 1 of each year and then averaged across all years
from 1976 to 1996. We define the “largest” stocks as those with market equities above the cutoff
for the largest third of the stocks on the NYSE.   Analogously, the “smallest” stocks are those
with market capitalizations below the cutoff for the smallest third.  Using these cutoffs, we
classify all stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  Naturally, the largest stocks comprise
a far larger component of the value of the overall market (83.1 percent) than the smallest stocks
(5.5 percent).  In contrast, the sale portfolio derives only 38.0 percent of its value from the
largest stocks and 29.1 percent from the smallest stocks.  The purchase portfolio has an even
more extreme tilt toward small stocks, with only 22.0 percent of its value from the largest stocks
and 41.2 percent from the smallest stocks.
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (1998) show that insiders tend to buy
“value” stocks and sell “growth” stocks, as defined by several different value and growth
measures.  This pattern also emerges in our purchase and sale portfolios, and can be illustrated
with a portfolio decomposition similar to the one we did for size. On July 1 of each year, we
calculate a book-to-market (BM) ratio for all stocks using their book value for the most recent
fiscal year (from COMPUSTAT) divided by market value as of the previous December 31.  We
then rank all NYSE stocks by their BM ratios and find the cutoffs for the highest third  (“value”)
and the lowest third (“growth”), and we use these cutoffs to classify all stocks.  Next, we
calculate the fractions of the purchase portfolio, sale portfolio, and overall market that fall into
the value and growth categories.  These fractions are computed once per year and then averaged
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across all years from 1976 to 1996. Using these definitions, the overall market consists of 50.2
percent growth stocks and 20.3 percent value stocks (and 29.5 percent in between).  Relative to
the market, the sale portfolio demonstrates a slight tilt toward growth stocks, with 52.8 percent
growth and 17.1 percent value.  The purchase portfolio exhibits a strong value tilt, with an
average of 34.1 percent growth and 34.8 percent value.
What are the returns to the purchase and sale portfolios?  Figure 4 plots the value over
time for a hypothetical investment of $1 on January 1, 1976.  Consistent with the results of
Figure 2, the purchase portfolio outperforms the market, while the sale portfolio earns returns
very close to the market.  The annualized returns are 23.0 percent for the purchase portfolio, 16.4
percent for the sale portfolio, and 15.6 percent for the market.18    Of course, simple comparisons
of portfolio returns to the market tell only part of the story.  To learn more, we need to use
performance-evaluation methods and calculate abnormal returns.  We turn to this task in the next
section.
3. Performance Evaluation of Insider Trades
In the section, we describe the performance-evaluation methods that we use to analyze
insider’s returns.  Since there is no consensus on the “right” model of expected returns, we
employ three methods that have proved useful in similar studies.  Our first method of
performance evaluation is the standard CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
                                               
18 This calculation ignores transactions costs, a policy that we follow throughout the paper and one that is consistent
with our purposes.  One could easily approximate the annual transactions costs for these portfolios by multiplying
portfolio turnover (100 percent, by construction) by an estimate of round trip transactions costs.15
Method 1:  CAPM 
t i,     t RMRF i     i      t f,  R   t i, R e b a + + = - , (1)
where Ri,t is the return on insider portfolio i in month t, Rf,t is the risk-free return in month t, and
RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate.  Here, ai can be
interpreted as the abnormal return to portfolio i.  Although research over the past 20 years has
produced significant evidence against this unconditional version of the CAPM, it is still used for
performance evaluation, both by academics and practitioners.19 Thus, it provides a good starting
point for our analysis.
Method 2:  4-Factor Model
One problem for the unconditional CAPM is that it cannot explain differences in returns
for portfolios sorted by stock characteristics such as size, past returns (momentum), or measures
of  “value” such as the price-to-earnings, cash-flow-to-price, and book-to-market ratios.20  Since
Section 2 presented evidence that the purchase and sale portfolios differ from the market along
size, momentum, and value dimensions, it is important that we adjust for these “strategies” in our
analysis. The 4-factor model of Carhart (1997) is ideally suited for this purpose and has proved
useful in several recent studies of performance evaluation.21  The model is estimated by
t i,     t PR1 i,4     t HML i,3     t SMB i,2      t RMRF i,1     i     t f,  R   t i, R e b b b b a + + + + + = -  ,  (2)
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Shirk et al. (1997).
20 See Basu (1977) (P/E ratio), Banz (1981) (size), Fama and French (1993) (size and book-to-market), Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) (several value measures), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (momentum).
21See Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Daniel et. al (1997), and Metrick (1999).16
where Ri,t, Rf,t, and RMRFt are defined as in (1).  The terms SMBt  (small minus big), HMLt (high
minus low), and PR1t  (previous one-year return) are the month t returns to zero-investment
factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects,
respectively.22  While there is an ongoing debate about whether these factors are proxies for risk,
we take no position on this issue and simply view the 4-factor model as a method of performance
attribution.  Thus, we interpret the estimated alphas as “abnormal returns” in excess of what
could have been achieved by passive zero-cost investments in the factors.
Table 1 summarizes the factor returns over the January 1976 to December 1996 sample
period.  As would be expected, average returns are positive for all of the factors: 73 basis points
a month for RMRF, 25 for SMB, 39 for HML, and 87 for PR1.  It is striking that the momentum
factor earns a higher average return than the market factor.  Note that these factor returns ignore
the transactions costs from their underlying trading strategies; such transaction costs would be
considerable for the monthly turnover necessary for PR1.  However, our insider purchase and
sale portfolios also ignore transactions costs, and thus it is reasonable to measure their
performance relative to costless strategies.
Method 3: Characteristic-Selectivity (CS) Measure
Our third measure of performance is the “characteristic-selectivity” (CS) measure
developed by Daniel et al. (1997). This method matches each insider transaction to a portfolio of
similar stocks, and then calculates an excess return relative to this portfolio on each day. This
approach takes advantage of the transactions nature of the data, which substantially increases the
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on the construction of the factors, see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). We are grateful to Mark Carhart
for providing the factor returns.17
precision of abnormal return estimates under some circumstances.23  Though the procedure is
conceptually straightforward, it is notationally cumbersome. We describe the basic idea here and
cover the details in Appendix B.
To obtain the CS measure, we begin by constructing 125 “bins” through independent
5x5x5 sorts on size, book-to-market, and momentum quintiles. NYSE breakpoints are used for
size and book-to-market, and combined NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq breakpoints are used for
momentum, with all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks placed into quintiles on the basis of these
breakpoints. Size and book-to-market sorts are performed once per year (on July 1), while
momentum sorts are performed at the beginning of every month.  Therefore, stocks can change
bins every month.   The three characteristics serve an analogous role to the SMB, HML, and PR1
factors in the 4-factor model.  In the CS approach, all stocks with the necessary data are allocated
to a bin, which we call its “matching bin”.24  Next, we calculate a daily value-weighted return for
each bin. Then, for each of our insider portfolios, the monthly measure of abnormal returns is
calculated as the return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long the insider portfolio and short
a portfolio constructed using equivalent weights in the matching bins.
We write Ri,t as the return to insider portfolio i in month t and Bin i,t as the return to the
matching bins of insider portfolio i in month t.  Then, the abnormal return to portfolio i for that
month, CS i,t, is equal to the difference between these two returns: CS i,t = R i,t – Bin i,t.  For the
252 months of the sample period, the overall performance measure, CS i is written as
                                               
23See Metrick (1999).
24Since some stocks must be excluded from this analysis because of a failure to match, the returns on the purchase
and sale portfolios will be slightly different here than for the factor models.  Appendix B, which discusses these
issues, shows that any potential biases are small.18
In this setup, CS i is comparable to a i from the factor models.  Its statistical significance can be
assessed by using the time-series standard error of CS i,t.
The next two sections show that these three methods provide very similar results for the
abnormal returns of insiders.  There are additional methods, of course, that could be used to
analyze returns, but no single analysis could employ all of them.25  We have no reason to believe
that our results would be qualitatively different using other methods.
4. The Level and Timing of Insider Profits
A. Performance Evaluation of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
 This section applies each of the three performance-evaluation methods to the purchase
and sale portfolios.  In discussing the results, we use “performance measure” and “abnormal
returns” as synonyms.  The relationship of abnormal returns to “insider profits” are reversed
between the purchase and sale portfolios.  Since the purchase portfolio holds the stocks that
insiders buy, a positive abnormal return implies positive insider profits.  Conversely, since the
sale portfolio holds the stocks that insiders sell, a negative abnormal return implies positive
insider profits.
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insider trading in Norway.  We believe that the CS approach addresses similar concerns as do conditional models,
with the added advantage that it exploits the transactions nature of the data.
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Table 2 gives the results for the purchase portfolio.    Under the CAPM, the purchase
portfolio has a significant a of 47 basis points per month.26   The CAPM b is 1.14 and is
significantly greater than one.  As we discussed in Section 2, insiders tend to purchase small
stocks, value stocks, and those with low momentum.  This strategy is also evident in the factor
loadings (or “betas”) from the 4-factor model, given in the third column of the table: positive and
significant loadings on SMB and HML, and a negative and significant loading on PR1.  In Table
1, we saw that the average returns are positive for all of these factors, so while the positive
loadings on SMB and HML explain some of the abnormal performance observed in the CAPM,
the negative loading on PR1 works in the opposite direction. Together, these factor loadings
account for less than one-quarter of the abnormal return from the CAPM, and the 4-factor model
a is a significant 37 basis points.  Notice that the adjusted R
2 for the 4-factor model is higher
than for the CAPM (.92 vs. .79), and this added explanatory power results in a relatively large
difference in the standard errors of the respective a estimates (16 vs. 11 basis points).
The CS measure for the purchase portfolio is similar to those for the CAPM and the 4-
factor model, with a significant estimate of 41 basis points.    Since the CS measure is computed
using a completely different method than are the alphas in the factor models, the similarity in
results is reassuring.  Taken together, the evidence from Table 2 shows that insiders earn
economically large abnormal returns from their purchases, with point estimates ranging between
37 and 47 basis points per month.   These results are consistent with evidence from studies that
use intensive-trading criteria.
The results for the sales portfolio appear in Table 3.  Here, all performance measures are
economically small and statistically insignificant.  The CAPM a is –9 basis points with a
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standard error of 14 basis points.  Recall that this portfolio is made up of insider sales, so
negative values of a indicate that insiders are “profiting” by selling stocks that subsequently
underperform; in this case, however, the profits are insignificant.  The CAPM b of 1.30 is
significantly greater than even the CAPM b from the purchase portfolio and indicates that
insiders sell stocks with high fundamental risk.  This high b estimate explains why the sale
portfolio can outperform the market in absolute terms (Figure 4), yet still earn negative abnormal
returns under the CAPM.
For the 4-factor model, the loadings for the sale portfolio are different from those found
for the purchase portfolio, with these differences consistent with our analysis in Section 2 and
with the results of Rozeff and Zaman (1998).  The loading on HML is negative and significant,
suggesting a tilt toward growth stocks.  The loading on SMB, while positive, is significantly
lower than for the purchase portfolio. Interestingly, the loading on PR1, while positive, is
economically small and statistically insignificant. Thus, even though insiders tend to sell stocks
that have recently increased in price, these stocks do not subsequently perform like other high-
momentum stocks. With these loadings, the 4-factor model yields a positive but insignificant a
of 5 basis points per month.  For the CS measure, the point estimate is an insignificant 6 basis
points per month.   Overall, there is no evidence that insiders earn abnormal returns in the sale
portfolio.  This is different from the typical finding in studies that use intensive-trading criteria;
we reconcile this difference in Section 5.A.27
Overall, these results show that “outsiders” have little to fear from insiders, at least those
who report their trades.  Consider an outsider contemplating the sale of a stock to gain liquidity.
                                               
27 An exception is Lakonishok and Lee (1998), who find that stocks sold “most intensively” by insiders do not
underperform.21
It is possible that this sale would be made to an insider, and insider purchases earn abnormal
returns of about 500 basis points in the first year.  However, since insiders purchase only about
0.03 percent of all stock (see Figure 1), her expected “costs” of trading against an insider are
only 0.15 basis points.28  Thus, for a $10,000 sale, she would be willing to pay about 15 cents to
ensure that the trade did not have an insider as counterparty.   This amount drops nearly to zero if
the outsider were making a purchase from an insider.  Although insiders make a much larger
proportion of all sales (0.15 percent) than purchases, than their abnormal returns on sales are
small or nonexistent.  Of course, there may be particular types of stocks or trades that lead to
higher expected losses for outsiders.  We deal with this issue further in Section 5.B.
B. The Timing of Insider’s Abnormal Returns
We can better understand the dynamics of abnormal returns through a time
decomposition of the purchase and sale portfolios.  To illustrate this decomposition, consider the
purchase portfolio.  Recall that this shadow portfolio holds all insider purchases, using closing
prices from their transaction dates, and keeps them in the portfolio for exactly one year.  Now,
we parse this strategy into portfolios that hold insider purchases for different subperiods during
that year: day0-day5, day5-day21, day21-month6, and month6-year1.   That is, when an insider
trade first occurs, it is placed into the first portfolio (day0-day5); then, at the end of day 5, the
purchase is removed from the first portfolio and placed into the second portfolio (day5-day21);
etc.  The days here are “trading days”; thus 21 days is approximately 1 month.  We follow the
same procedure to decompose the sale portfolio.
                                               
28 The calculation is 500 * .0003 = .15 basis points.  To make this calculation, we assume that stocks sold to
insiders subsequently outperform stocks sold to non-insiders by 5 percent.   We do not argue that the insider trades
somehow “cause” this edge in performance; rather, the point here is to provide another perspective on the expected
value of the insiders’ superior information.22
Table 4 shows annualized returns for each of these portfolios. For purchases, the
annualized returns are higher than the market in each case.  The day0-day5 portfolio, which
contains all stocks purchased in the previous five days, earns annualized returns of 57.6 percent.
Either insiders time their purchases well or the market is somehow finding out about these
purchases and reacting to them.  Somewhat surprising, however, are the returns earned by the
day0-day5 sale portfolio.  Since this portfolio holds stocks that insiders have sold over the
previous five days, the high returns suggest insiders lose money relative to the market for the
first five days after a sale.
For both purchases and sales, the same patterns over the first five days are repeated at
smaller magnitudes over the subsequent 16 days, as can be seen from the day5-day21 results.
After the first 21 days, purchases modestly outperform the market, whereas sales perform
similarly to the market.  To give more precise statements about performance, we turn to the
performance-evaluation models.
Table 5 gives performance measures and standard errors for the day0-day5, day5-day21,
day21-month6, and month6-year1 purchase and sale portfolios.  The top panel gives the CAPM
alphas, the middle panel gives the 4-factor alphas, and the bottom panel gives the CS measures.
The results confirm the significance of the patterns seen in Table 4. The day0-day5 purchase
portfolio has highly significant positive point estimates across all models; these estimates range
between 252 and 304 basis points per month. These returns illustrate the importance of using
daily data to evaluate insider performance; any study that starts on report dates or uses only
monthly data will miss this effect. These monthly abnormal returns translate into daily abnormal
returns of about 13 basis points, or about 65 basis points over five trading days.  Whether this is
seen as economically “large” depends on the context.  For example, the day0-day5 portfolio23
completely turns over every five trading days, far more often than any of the other portfolios
studied in this paper.  Assuming a one percent roundtrip transaction cost, the day0-day5 portfolio
would incur approximately 400 basis points in transactions costs per month.  Thus, the abnormal
returns are not sufficient to allow a profitable trading strategy after transactions costs, even if
such a trading strategy were otherwise feasible.
The purchase portfolio continues to earn abnormal returns well beyond 5 days.  The
day5-day21 portfolio earns significant abnormal returns of 129 basis points under the CAPM,
114 under the 4-factor model, and 136 for the CS measure.  For most insider transactions, more
than 21 days pass before the transactions get reported and made public.  The corresponding
estimates for the day21-month6 portfolio are 54 basis points for the CAPM, 29 for the 4-factor
model, and 36 for the CS measure. Of these three estimates, all but the 4-factor a are significant.
For the month6-year1 portfolio, all the point estimates are positive, but none is significant.  The
point estimates from Table 5 enable us to approximately decompose the overall abnormal returns
to the purchase portfolio; using either the CS measure or the 4-factor a as our guide, about three-
quarters of the total one-year return comes in the first six months, one-third comes in the first
month, and one-sixth comes in the first five days.29
The most striking results of Table 5 are found for the day0-day5 sale portfolio. The
abnormal performance for this portfolio is positive and significant under all models, with point
estimates ranging between 80 and 96 basis points per month.  This is approximately equivalent to
4 to 5 basis points per trading day.  While these results are consistent with the returns presented
in Table 4, they still seem to be counterintuitive. Why would the stocks that insiders sell perform
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basis points per year.  Since the point estimate for the month6-year1 portfolio is 19 basis points, we attribute 19 * 6
= 114 of the total to the last six months.  Similar calculations for the other horizons yield the estimates in the text.24
so well over the subsequent five days?  In section 5.A, we present evidence to show that these
short-horizon returns can be explained by the recovery from the price-depressing effect of high-
volume insider sales.  That is, they are largely a market microstructure effect.
At longer horizons, sale portfolios fail to earn significant abnormal returns, with the
alphas and CS measures economically close to zero in most cases.  Since our main sale portfolio,
analyzed in Section 4.A, holds stocks for one year, the positive abnormal returns earned in the
first five days do not noticeably change the overall results.
5. A Closer Look at Insider Profits
Thus far, we have confined our analysis to the aggregate purchase and sale portfolios. In
this section, we decompose the purchase and sale portfolios along several dimensions: volume of
the trade, size of the firm, insider’s position in the firm, and whether the trade is executed
directly for an insider or indirectly for another party.   These subclasses have been studied using
intensive-trading criteria and/or event-study methods, techniques that could aid other investors in
forecasting future stock returns. Our analysis asks a different question – how much do insiders
profit in each type of trade? –  and thus uses performance-evaluation methods on value-weighted
returns to answer it.
A.  The Volume of a Trade
Are high-volume trades the most profitable? There are logical reasons to believe that the
highest-volume trades would reflect the strongest insider beliefs about corporate performance.
However, such trades may have other motivations.  For example, insiders with sizeable corporate
holdings may make high-volume sales for diversification or liquidity purposes; such sales may25
be motivated more by a desire to reduce risk or buy a new house than to increase returns.  Also,
high-volume purchases may be related to a quest for corporate control and its non-pecuniary
benefits and may only partially be related to expectation of future returns.   On a more cynical
note, one might believe that high-volume trades are more likely to be scrutinized by the SEC, so
that insiders who report trades on illegal “inside information” may wish to take lower profits, by
reducing or splintering trades, in order to reduce the probability of detection.  These factors all
militate against finding the highest-volume trades to be the most profitable.
Past research has generally found a positive relationship between trade volume and
insider profits, although this relationship may break down for the highest-volume trades.30  In
this section, we reexamine this relationship through the lens of our portfolio-based approach.
Thus, we are able to extend the analysis to include the daily returns immediately following the
trades and analyzing these returns using performance-evaluation methods.  Our approach also
allows for a time-decomposition of returns similar to Section 4.B; this decomposition can then
provide insight into the puzzling day0-day5 returns of the sale portfolio.
We begin by decomposing the purchase and sale portfolios by trade volume into “low-
volume”, “medium-volume”, and “high-volume” purchase and sale portfolios.   To form these
portfolios, we first calculate the fraction of firm equity traded in each transaction. For example, a
purchase of 10,000 shares of a stock with 100 million shares outstanding would represent 0.01
percent of equity.  Next, we sort all trades by these equity fractions, with purchases and sales
ranked separately.   Based on these rankings, we divide purchases and sales into thirds: “low”,
medium”, and “high”. This yields cutoffs of 0.004 and 0.028 percent for the purchase portfolios,
                                               
30 See Seyhun (1986), Pascutti (1996), and Seyhun (1998).  Jaffe (1974) finds no difference between overall tests
and tests restricted to high-volume trades, but this may be due to his sample of only the largest NYSE firms, where
the trade-volume effect has been found to be weakest (Seyhun (1998)).26
and 0.010 and 0.048 percent for the sale portfolios.  That is, all sales below 0.010 percent of firm
equity are classified as “low-volume”, above 0.048 percent are classified as “high-volume”, and
in-between as “medium-volume”.31  For our purposes, this procedure offers two advantages over
simpler classifications based on absolute measures such as the number of shares or dollars
traded.   First, the absolute measures are highly correlated with firm size, and analyses based on
them might confound firm-size and trade-volume effects.  Our use of equity fractions mitigates
this problem.  Second, our approach increases the chance that trades with a large “market-
impact” are classified as “high-volume”.32  The importance of this property will be seen below.
The performance measures for the trade-volume portfolios are summarized in Table 6. To
compare estimates across the different portfolios, we estimate each model as a seemingly-
unrelated-regression (SUR) for the six decomposed purchase and sale portfolios; this framework
provides estimates for the covariance of the performance measures.33  The abnormal returns for
the high-volume and medium-volume purchase portfolios are economically large and statistically
significant on all tests, with magnitudes that are similar both to each other and to the overall
purchase portfolio.  The low-volume purchase portfolio earns considerably lower abnormal
returns, although its 4-factor a and CS measure are still positive and significant. Using
covariance estimates from the SUR (not reported in Table 6), we find that the medium-volume
purchase portfolio achieves significantly higher performance measures on all three tests than
does the low-volume purchase portfolio.  Differences between the high-volume and low-volume
                                               
31 We use the whole sample period to make these cutoffs, but this procedure – which looks forward as well as
backward – should not introduce any bias in this case.
32 Trades could also be classified using dollar trading volume (rather than firm equity) in the denominator.
Unfortunately, CRSP does not include volume data for Nasdaq firms until 1983, so this method is not feasible.
33 In our case, the SUR approach yields exactly the same point estimates and standard errors as would separate
estimations, and provides the covariance estimates necessary for our comparisons.  Another method to compare
performance measures is to evaluate the returns to zero-investment strategies that are long in one portfolio (e.g. low-
volume purchases) and short in another (e.g. medium-volume purchases).   The SUR and zero-investment
approaches are mathematically equivalent.27
performance measures are significant at the ten-percent level on all tests.  The overall results for
the purchase portfolios are consistent with Seyhun’s (1998) findings.
Performance measures for the sale portfolios are economically small and – with one
exception – not statistically significant. Under the CAPM, the low-volume sale portfolio earns
significant negative abnormal returns.  The point estimate of -15 basis points is not economically
large, but it is relatively precisely estimated.   This precision derives from the well-diversified
nature of the low-volume portfolio which, by construction, cannot be dominated by a small
number of positions.  Note that there is no significant relationship between trade volume and
profits for insider sales on any of the tests: none of the performance measures is significantly
different from any other.
The results of Table 6 can help us to reconcile our overall findings with those of other
authors.  Recall that our estimated abnormal returns for purchases (Table 2) are similar to those
found in other studies.  Since the medium-volume and high-volume portfolios comprise two-
thirds of all trades and also represent the vast majority of traded shares and traded value, they
tend to dominate both our tests and the tests used by other authors.  In contrast, the abnormal
returns for our sale portfolios are close to zero, while most other studies find negative abnormal
returns after sales. For tests based on the CAPM, these results are consistent with our findings.
The low- and medium-volume sale portfolios both have negative abnormal returns, and the
magnitude of these returns, while small, is similar to those found by other authors.  The large-
trade sale portfolio, however, has slightly positive (but insignificant) abnormal returns, and it is
this portfolio that dominates our value-weighted analyses.  Thus, a value-weighted approach
finds no abnormal returns for sales.28
To shed light on the counterintuitive positive abnormal returns for the day0-day5 sale
portfolio, we perform the same time decomposition for each trade-volume portfolio that we did
in Section 4.B for the overall purchase and sale portfolios.  Table 7 illustrates the returns to the
low-, medium-, and high-volume purchase and sale portfolios for the day0-day5 subperiod.  The
table gives compelling evidence that the positive abnormal returns earned by the day0-day5 sale
portfolio are entirely driven by the highest-volume transactions.  The high-volume sale portfolio
has positive and significant performance measures under all models, with point estimates ranging
between 130 and 144 basis points.  Conversely, the performance measures for the low-volume
sale portfolio are negative and significant under all models; this is the direction that would be
expected when insiders make information-driven trades.  Our hypothesis is that the high-volume
trades are driven primarily by liquidity or diversification motives, and that these big trades cause
downward price pressure, so that the day0-day5 abnormal returns are positive while the market
“bounces back” from this pressure.34  Since price pressure is small or nonexistent for medium-
and low-volume trades, we do not observe the same positive abnormal returns for those
portfolios. Since the high-volume trades dominate the value-weighted sale portfolio, they are
capable of driving the perverse short-run effect. This market-microstructure effect does not
prevent the high-volume purchase portfolio from earning positive returns; here, the information
component of these purchases overcomes any possible microstructure effect on prices.35
                                               
34 This kind of volume-based autocorrelation is documented in Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994).
35 In addition, high-volume sales are bigger, on average, than high-volume purchases (see cutoffs given in Table 7),
so the microstructure effect is likely to be smaller for the purchases than for sales.29
B.  Firm Size
Several studies that use intensive-trading criteria and event-study methods show that
insider trading is most profitable in small firms (Seyhun (1986) and (1998), Pascutti (1996),
Lakonishok and Lee (1998)).  This empirical finding is consistent with intuition. The smaller the
firm, the easier it is for a single manager to know more relevant information.  And since small
firms receive less attention than large firms do from Wall Street analysts, the smaller the firm,
the more likely that insiders hold an informational advantage over other market participants.
We analyze the relationship between firm size and insider returns by decomposing the
purchase and sale portfolios.  At the beginning of each month, we divide the stocks traded on the
NYSE into thirds based on size (market value).  We then use the cutoffs for these thirds to place
all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks into one of three categories: “small-firm”, “medium-firm”, and
“large-firm”.   Each insider transaction is then placed into a portfolio on the day of the trade
based on the size of the firm.  This holding stays in the same portfolio for the full year, even if
the firm crosses a size cutoff.  This procedure results in six portfolios (three for purchases and
three for sales).
We present the results in Table 8.  As would be expected from the other results of this
paper, none of the sale portfolios earn significant abnormal returns under any of the methods.
The results are more interesting for the purchase portfolios. The small-firm purchase portfolio
earns significant abnormal returns under all three methods, with point estimates ranging between
31 and 51 basis points per month. For the other purchase portfolios, only the large-firm portfolio
earns significant abnormal returns on any test (32 basis points per month for the CS measure).
Nevertheless, the performance measures for the small-firm purchase portfolio are never
significantly different from the corresponding measures for either the medium- or large-firm30
purchase portfolios.36  In fact, the biggest difference occurs under the CAPM (51 basis points for
small-firm purchases vs. 5 basis points for large-firm purchases), and some of this is certainly
attributable to the small-firm anomaly in the CAPM.37  Under the 4-factor model, the difference
in abnormal returns between the small- and large-firm purchase portfolios drops by half (relative
to the CAPM difference), and for the CS measure it disappears completely.  Thus, and not
surprisingly, the marginal impact of firm size on insider profits is considerably smaller (or
nonexistent) once we control for size-related return anomalies.38  These results are not driven by
our use of only three size portfolios: there remains no significant difference between the
performance measures (4-factor alphas and CS measures) of the smallest and largest purchase
portfolios even if we use five or ten size groupings.39
While there is no significant difference in abnormal returns among the trade-size
portfolios, the probability of selling to an insider is much higher for small stocks (0.14 percent)
than for large ones (0.02 percent).  Using the CS measure as our guide, an outsider making a sale
of a small stock faces an expected loss of 0.43 basis points due to the possibility he is trading
with an insider.  While this is hardly monumental, it is approximately seven times higher than the
equivalent expected cost when trading in large stocks.
C. Insider’s Position within the Firm
Some insiders are more “inside” than others.  The chief executive, for example, is likely
to have better information about the firm’s prospects than do lesser officers.  Of course, since the
CEO’s trades are likely to be carefully scrutinized, both by shareholders and by regulators, he
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37 See Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1993).
38 This same point is made by Rozeff and Zaman (1988), although their focus is on returns that can be earned by
outsiders following the publication of insider trading data.
39 These results are available from the authors.31
may be more reluctant to trade on his informational advantage.  The net effect of these
considerations on the profitability of insider trading is an empirical question.   Seyhun (1986 and
1998) analyzes the relationship between insiders’ positions in their firms and the profitability of
their trades, and concludes that there is an “information hierarchy”, with top executives at the
top, other officers in the middle, and directors at the bottom.  In this section we study this
information hierarchy using performance-evaluation methods applied to value-weighted portfolio
returns.
We begin by decomposing the purchase and sale portfolios based on the job title of the
insider.  “Top executives” are chief executives, chairmen of the board, and presidents.
“Officers” include all corporate officers except for top executives.  “Directors” are members of
the corporate board who are not also officers.  These categories do not overlap, and they cover
all trades in our sample.40  This decomposition results in three purchase portfolios and three sale
portfolios. The top-executive purchase portfolio constitutes 10.0 percent of the total purchase
portfolio, the officer-purchase portfolio 20.5 percent, and the director-purchase portfolio 69.5
percent.  For sales, top-executives constitute 12.7 percent, officers 41.7 percent, and directors
45.6 percent.
The performance measures for these portfolios are summarized in Table 9.  We estimate
each model as a SUR so that performance estimates can be compared across portfolios.  None of
the sale portfolios earn significant abnormal returns on any of the tests.  As usual, the purchase
portfolios offer more varied results.  The officer-purchase and director-purchase portfolios have
significant abnormal returns under all tests, with point estimates close to those found for the
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any of these categories. We exclude them  from the beginning; they are not represented in the purchase and sale
portfolios.  Please see Appendix A.32
overall purchase portfolio.  Surprisingly, the top-executive purchase portfolio does not earn
significant abnormal returns under any of the tests; however, while these point estimates are
always below those for the officer-purchase and director-purchase portfolios, they never differ
from them significantly. Thus, we cannot conclude that top executives do worse with their
purchases than do officers or directors.
The difference between equal- and value-weighted analyses allows us to reconcile our
results with Seyhun’s. The trades of top executives are about twice as big, on average, as those of
officers and directors.  Also, top executives are responsible for a disproportionate number of the
very largest purchases.  If the abnormal returns to purchases fall off for the very largest trades,
then all of the results are consistent.41 We do not adjust for the interaction of trade volume with
insider type because that is not the purpose of our analysis; if top executives trade in higher-
volume blocks than other insiders, we view this decision as a conscious choice of how they use
their information, and we are only interested in the net result on their profits.
The results of this section demonstrate why a value-weighted, portfolio-based analysis
provides an important perspective on insider trading.  Seyhun’s results are important for
outsiders seeking to profit from the information content of insider trades; he shows that the
trades of top executives, whether equally-weighted or conditional on trade size, are more
informative about future returns than are the trades of other insiders.   Our results are important
to regulators, and to outsiders who may be trading with insiders. We show that, unconditionally,
a dollar traded by a top executive earns no higher return than a dollar traded by another insider.
                                               
41 Seyhun’s (1998) analysis uses many categories of trade volume to search for the most informative
trades about future returns.  He finds a concave relationship between trade volume and abnormal returns, with
abnormal returns falling off for the very highest trades.  Our analysis in Section 5.A. found medium-volume
purchases earning the same abnormal returns as large-volume purchases.  This is consistent with the concave
relationship found by Seyhun.33
D. Direct vs. Indirect Ownership of Shares
Insider’s holdings can be subdivided into two broad categories.  “Direct” holdings are
held in the insider’s name.  “Indirect” holdings are held in the name of another person, where the
corporate insider has a pecuniary interest, by reason of any contract, understanding, or
relationship.42  With the exception of Pascutti (1996), past studies of insider trading have not
distinguished between these two types of ownership.
In this section, we divide the sale and purchase portfolios into their direct and indirect
components.  Thus, the direct-purchase portfolio contains all purchases for direct holdings made
over the previous year; the other portfolios are indirect-purchases, direct-sales, and indirect-sales.
The direct portfolios comprise the majority of both the purchase and sales portfolios, but the
indirect portfolios are still substantial, comprising 41.5 percent of the sale portfolio and 21.9
percent of the purchase portfolio.
It is not obvious what to expect for the relative performance of direct and indirect
portfolios.  For direct trades, insiders are likely to exercise total discretionary control and keep
all the proceeds.  In many indirect trades, insiders exercise considerably less discretion and have
smaller personal incentives.   This suggests that direct trades would be more likely to reflect
insider information and yield higher profits.
 However, insiders make many of their direct trades – particularly those of high volume –
to diversify their portfolios or gain more control of the corporation.  Indirect trades, on the other
hand, are less likely to be driven by considerations of control or diversification, especially since
indirect holders usually do not have their human capital invested in the firm.    Similarly,
purchases designed to increase control are probably more likely for a direct holding than for an
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indirect one.  Since these considerations are stronger for high-volume transactions, they have the
potential to dominate a value-weighted analysis.  This reasoning suggests that profits will be
higher for indirect trades than for direct ones.
Table 10 summarizes the evidence for the direct and indirect purchase and sale portfolios.
Once again, we estimate each model as a SUR so that the performance estimates can be
compared across portfolios. The CAPM a for the direct-purchase portfolio is 60 basis points; the
corresponding a for the indirect-purchase portfolio is 43 basis points.  These point estimates are
significantly different from zero, but not from each other.    The 4-factor alphas and CS measures
show a similar pattern.  The direct-purchase portfolio earns a 4-factor a of 51 basis points and a
CS measure of 60 basis points, both of which are significant.   The indirect-purchase portfolio
has a 4-factor a of 34 basis points and a CS measure of 31 basis points, but only the former
measure is significant.  For each of the three tests, the performance measure for the direct-
purchase portfolio has a higher point estimate than the corresponding measure for the indirect-
purchase portfolio, but the difference is never significant. For the direct-sales and indirect-sales
portfolios, all of the performance measures are economically small and statistically insignificant.
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence of differential profits between direct and indirect trades.
6. Conclusion
There are three good reasons to study the profitability of trades by corporate insiders:
science, profit, and policy.  Science examines the implications of the findings for market
efficiency.  Profit hopes to develop optimal trading strategies, following the actions of insiders.
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Policy seeks to determine the effectiveness of insider trading rules, and the implications of
insider profitability for both fairness and market performance.
Our analysis focused on science and policy.  It began with the central question: How
much do insiders profit when they trade stock in their own firms?  To address this question, we
employed performance-evaluation methods that analyze value-weighted portfolios comprised of
all insider trades.  This approach – new to the insider trading literature – enables us to compute
any abnormal returns earned by insiders.
Insiders profit handsomely from their purchases, but not at all from their sales. This is not
surprising.  Insider purchases likely reflect favorable information.  Insider sales, by contrast, are
often made from shares received as part of executive compensation.  Therefore, these sales may
be undertaken to gain liquidity or diversify holdings, implying little information content.  Given
the sources and motivations of insiders’ sales, it is not surprising that their dollar volume is
nearly eight times that of purchases.
Insiders’ transactions differ from the market as a whole.  Insiders disproportionately
purchase shares in small firms, value firms, and those that have recently underperformed.  Their
sales are made mainly in growth firms that have experienced high recent returns.  To correct for
differences in returns that may be driven entirely by these distinctive characteristics of insider
transactions, we calculated abnormal returns using three different performance-evaluation
methods.  Under all three methods, the story is much the same.  The abnormal returns to a value-
weighted portfolio of all insider purchases—holding positions for one year—are roughly 40 basis
points per month, an economically and statistically significant magnitude.  The first five days
after purchase yield approximately one-sixth of the abnormal return, and one-third comes within
the first month.  This evidence suggests that insider buyers have a good feel for near-term36
developments within their firm, or that actions by others who follow their trades move the
market.  None of our methods find that insider sales reap profits.
Our performance-evaluation methods can readily determine whether particular types of
trades do better or worse.  Thus, we look at profitability by firm size, the dollar volume of the
transaction, and the insider’s position within the firm.  We find that the trades of top executives
do no better than those of their less lofty peers.  Similarly, firm size does not affect the
profitability of insider trading.  However, low-volume purchases are less profitable than those of
higher-volume.  We made no attempt to look at the potential for profitably following insiders’
trades; other methods are better suited to that investigation, and the prior literature has covered
them well.
What should policy makers think of our results?  Surely insiders have valuable
information.  If they do, only a Draconian regulatory system could prevent them from trading
profitably, and the evidence shows that the existing system does not.  Policy makers can be
reassured, however, that the system is sufficiently effective -- presumably by holding down both
the volume and profitability of insider trades -- that outsiders are not significantly disadvantaged
when selling stock on the open market, and they are not disadvantaged at all when buying.
Inside purchases comprise just 0.02% of all purchases on the open market; on average, outsiders
lose just 15 cents on a $10,000 sale because an insider may be on the other side.  But in circles
where this happy information is not widely known, investors with inflated perceptions of their
disadvantage may still be reluctant to trade.
Our principal accomplishment in this paper was to quantify the tilt in the playing field
enjoyed by insiders.   Due to the disparity of numbers between insiders and outsiders, what
appears as an easy downward slide for the insiders produces an imperceptible upward tilt for37
those who must trade against them. Inside traders are like ace handicappers at the racetrack.
They profit nicely, but only by imposing tiny losses on the masses.  The question of fairness falls
to the eye of the beholder.38
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Appendix A – Data Issues
Form 4 must be filed with the SEC within ten days following the end of each month in
which there is a change in direct or indirect insider ownership.  Among the information required
on Form 4 are: name and address of reporting person, issuer name and ticker or trading symbol,
relationship of reporting person to the issuer (i.e., officer, director, etc.), filing date, type of
security traded, transaction date (month/day/year), transaction code (e.g., open-market
transaction, private transaction, transaction under an employee stock ownership plan), number of
equity securities traded, per share price of equity securities, ownership form (direct or indirect).43
We restrict our study to open-market transactions in equity securities that have data
available from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  Over the January 1, 1975, to
December 31, 1996, sample period, there were 899,146 open-market transactions (386,102
                                               
43 Goodman (1991).41
purchases and 513,044 sales). 44   Of this number, 17,340 (1.9 percent) have missing transaction
dates, leaving 881,806.  We next purged duplicate transactions from this total.  We defined a
duplicate as a transaction with identical data in all categories.  We believe these duplicates can
occur for many innocuous reasons.  This step removes 57,145 (6.5 percent) and leaves 824,661.
Prior to May 1991, Form 4 distinguished between open-market purchases and sales
(transaction codes P and S) and private transactions (transaction codes J and K).  During this
period, open-market transactions outnumber private transactions by a ratio of about 11 to 1.
After May 1991, private transactions use the same codes as open-market transactions.  Ideally,
we would exclude private transactions from our database; these transactions may take place with
restricted securities, the counterparty often knows he is trading with an insider, and the trade is
much more likely to be executed for liquidity or diversification motives than are open-market
transactions.  Therefore, we do not include any private transactions prior to May 1991, and we
use several filter rules, discussed below, to eliminate the largest private transactions after this
date.  These same filter rules also serve to purge the data of obvious coding errors.
Our first filter is to remove all transactions where the shares traded exceed trading
volume for that day.  Since private transactions would not be included in the exchange traded
volume of the day, this filter is likely to catch many of the largest post-1991 private transactions.
This results in the loss of 4,030 transactions (0.5 percent) and leaves us with 820,631.  Our
second filter purges all transactions whose prices fall outside the daily trading range reported on
CRSP.  We call these “bad prices”. There are many reasons that bad prices can occur: a private
transaction may be executed outside of the range; the date, price, or transaction type may be
miscoded by the insider; input error may be made by the data provider, etc.  The frequency of
                                               
44For transaction dates after May 1991, there are also some private transactions in our data set.  Our methods for
disentangling these trades from open-market transactions are discussed below.42
these problems, given below, is high enough to dissuade us from using the reported transaction
prices in our analysis.  Furthermore, most of the reasons given for bad prices would also render
the transaction unsuitable for inclusion in the purchase and sale portfolios, even using the closing
prices.
Our analysis suggests that the majority of transactions with “bad prices” are due to
miscodes of the date (either by the insider or the data provider).  Our procedure necessitates that
we first purge all transactions where CRSP provides no information on the trading range.  This
results in a loss of 35,431 transactions (4.3 percent).  Of the remaining 785,200 transactions,
221,337 (28.2 percent) have bad prices.  To see how many of these may be due to simple
miscodes of the date (perhaps because the filing date is miscoded as the trading date), we
calculate a trading range beginning on the first day of the previous month and extending until the
last day of the current month.  Out of 221,337 trades with bad prices, 163,141 (73.7 percent) fall
within this extended trading range.  The remaining 58,196 trades with bad prices are likely to be
private transactions not caught in the previous filter, and other miscodes by the insider or the
data provider.  Our final data set includes 563,863 transactions (214,897 purchases and 348,966
sales).
These filters have not caught all possible errors in the data.  For example, any miscoded
dates that do not have bad prices will remain in the data set.   Since such trades must necessarily
be in stocks with small price changes around the transactions, they are likely to bias our
abnormal returns toward zero.  Our diagnostic tests suggest that the value-weighted fraction of
such bad trades is likely to be small and should not cause qualitative changes in our results.
Similarly, some private transactions will escape the filters.  Since our filters would have caught
about 72 percent of the private transactions before May 1991, and the ratio of private43
transactions to open-market transactions is small, we doubt that the remaining private
transactions would cause qualitative changes in our results.
Appendix B – The Characteristic-Selectivity (CS) Measure
This appendix provides the details for the computation of the CS measure described in
Section 3.  This measure is based on the methodology of Daniel et al. (1997).  For each insider
transaction portfolio, the monthly measure of abnormal returns is calculated as the return on a
zero-investment portfolio that is long in the insider transaction portfolio and short in a portfolio
constructed using equivalent weights in the matching bins.  In effect, one just combines the
monthly abnormal returns for each stock in the portfolio.
The assumption underlying this model is that all stocks in the same bin have exactly the
same expected return.  If this assumption is satisfied, then the performance measure will have a
zero expected return at all times.  Thus, the insider portfolios that shift their portfolio
composition conditional on expected factor realizations will have no bias in their estimated
performance measure.
A more formal description of the methodology is:
d. day  on    i   portfolio by    s stock  on    placed   weight    d s(i), W
and   d, day  on    s stock     to matched   b bin  for  return  net      d b(s), R
d, day  on    s stock  for  return  net      d s, R
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i,   portfolio by    held   s   stocks   all   of set      the : i s






Using this notation, the CS measure for each month, CSi,t, is then calculated as
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where  ( ) ￿ ˛ *
i s s,d s(i),d R W  is the actual net return for portfolio i on day d and  ( ) ￿ ˛ *
i s d b(s), d s(i), R W
is the net return that would be achieved on day d if all funds were invested in the matching bins.
The CSi measure (Equation 3) is then calculated as the mean of the monthly CSi,t measures.
Not all stocks will be included in the CS calculation; if a stock cannot be matched to a
bin, then it is not included in the test. The two main reasons for a failure to match are, first,
insufficient past returns for a momentum calculation and, second, the absence of a book-equity
observation in COMPUSTAT. Both of these data requirements lead to new issues being deleted
from the portfolios. To the extent that new issues underperform similar stocks, this causes an
upward bias in the estimated selectivity performance measure.45  If such an upward bias exists, it
does not seem to have a significant effect on the results.  For example, when we repeat the
CAPM and 4-factor tests of Tables 2 and 3 using returns calculated only from stocks that have
bin assignments, then the results are almost identical: the CAPM a is 45 basis points for
purchases (two points lower than the corresponding a of 47 basis points in Table 2) and –9 basis
points for sales (exactly the same as the corresponding a in Table 3); the 4-factor a is 42 basis
points for purchases (five points higher than the corresponding a of 37 basis points in Table 2)
and nine basis points for sales (four basis points higher than the corresponding a of five basis
points in Table 3).
                                               
45 See Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) for evidence on the new-issues bias. On a “bin-
adjusted” basis, Brav and Gompers’ (1997) work suggests that this bias should not be large. See also Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995) for a discussion of the bias induced by omitting stocks that do not have data in
COMPUSTAT.45
Figure 1
Percentage of Market Volume Traded by Insiders
This figure plots insiders’ purchases and sales as a percentage of market volume for each month of the
sample period.  The percentage is calculated as the total value in all securities of insider purchases (sales)
for that month divided by the total value of all monthly trading on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  The
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Figure 2
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Measured from the Date of Insider Transactions
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measured from the date of insider
purchase and sale transactions.  Daily abnormal returns are defined here as a stock’s return minus the
value-weighted market return. These daily abnormal returns are calculated for the day of the transaction
(day 0) and for each of the 100 days before and after the transaction.  The CAR for day -t is the sum of
daily abnormal returns beginning on day -t and ending on day 0.  The CAR for day t is the sum of the
daily abnormal returns beginning on day 0 and ending on day t.  This procedure yields a time-series of
CARs for each insider purchase and sale; these CARs are averaged across all purchases and sales to
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Figure 3
Insider Purchase and Sale Portfolios as a Percentage of Total Market Capitalization
This figure shows the percentage of the market held in our insider purchase and sale
portfolios.  The purchase (sale) portfolio includes all shares purchased (sold) by insiders
over the previous year.   On each day, we calculate the percentage of the total market
value (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq) held in each of these portfolios. Monthly percentages are
expressed as the mean of the daily percentages from that month; these monthly
percentages are then plotted in the figure. For the sample period of January 1, 1976 to
December 31, 1996, the averages of these monthly percentages are 0.02 percent for






























































































Returns to Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This figure plots the value of a hypothetical $1 investment on January 1, 1976, in the
purchase portfolio, sale portfolio, and the value-weighted market. The purchase (sale)
portfolio includes all shares purchased (sold) by insiders over the previous year.  The
value-weighted market includes all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms.  The annualized
returns to these portfolios are 23.0 percent for purchases, 16.4 percent for sales, and 15.6





































































































Summary Statistics of Factor Returns
This table provides summary statistics for the factors used in the CAPM (equation 1) and
the 4-factor model (equation 2).  These factors –  RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1 –
represent the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-
to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.  (Consult Fama and French (1993) and
Carhart (1997) on the construction of these factors.)  The sample is from January 1, 1976
to December 31, 1996.
Factor Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RMRF 0.73% 4.27 % - 22.77% 12.68 %
SMB 0.25 2.53 - 9.79 9.06
HML 0.39 2.53 - 8.49 8.92
PR1 0.87 2.81 - 10.65 10.0250
Table 2
Performance-Evaluation Results for Purchase Portfolio
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for the purchase portfolio.  The purchase
portfolio includes all shares purchased by insiders over the previous year.  Column 2 gives the results
for the CAPM (equation 1).  Column 3 gives the results for the 4-factor model (equation 2).  Column
4 gives the results for the CS measure (equation 3).  For the factor models, a is the regression
intercept, and the next four rows give coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the
independent variables: RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1.  These independent variables are the returns to
zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects,
respectively. (Consult Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) on the construction of these
factors.)  The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and at the one-
percent level, respectively.  The bottom row of the table provides the R
2 for the factor regressions.
The sample is from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.




















Performance-Evaluation Results for Sale Portfolio
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for the sale portfolio.  The sale
portfolio includes all shares sold by insiders over the previous year.  Column 2 gives the
results for the CAPM (equation 1).  Column 3 gives the results for the 4-factor model
(equation 2).  Column 4 gives the results for the CS measure (equation 3).  For the factor
models, a is the regression intercept, and the next four rows give coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) for the independent variables: RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1.  These
independent variables are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture
market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. (Consult Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) on the construction of these factors.)  The symbols * and
** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level, respectively.
The bottom row of the table provides the R
2 for the factor regressions.  The sample is from
January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.





















 Time Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table provides the annualized returns for decompositions of the purchase and sale
portfolios into four holding periods: day0-day5, day5-day21, day21-month6, and month6-
year1.  At the close of trading on the day of an insider transaction, the purchase or sale is
placed into the day0-day5 portfolio; at the end of day 5, the trade is removed from the
previous portfolio and placed into the day5-day21 portfolio; etc. This decomposition is
done separately for purchases and sales.  The sample is from January 1, 1976 to
December 31, 1996.  The bottom row shows the annualized return on the value-weighted
market for the same sample period.
day0-day5 day5-day21 day21-month6 month6-year1
Purchase 57.6% 34.7% 23.2% 18.3%
Sale 28.9 18.9 15.3 16.6
Market 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6%53
Table 5
Performance-Evaluation Results for
 Time Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale portfolios into
four holding periods: day0-day5, day5-day21, day21-month6, and month6-year1.  At the close of trading on the day
that an insider transaction occurs, the purchase or sale is placed into the day0-day5 portfolio; at the end of day 5, the
trade is removed from the previous portfolio and placed into the day5-day21 portfolio; etc.This decomposition is
done separately for purchases and sales. The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM
(equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom
portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate
two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level, respectively. The sample is from January 1,























































 Trade-Volume Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and sale portfolios by
trade volume.  To form our component portfolios, we first calculate the percentage of firm equity traded in each
transaction. Next, we sort all trades by these equity percentages, with purchases and sales ranked separately.   Based
on these rankings, we divide purchases and sales into thirds: “low-volume”, “medium-volume”, and “high-volume”.
This yields cutoffs of 0.004 and 0.028 percent for the purchase thirds, and 0.010 and 0.048 percent for the sales
thirds; i.e, all sales below 0.010 percent of firm equity are classified as low-volume, above 0.048 percent are
classified as high-volume, and in-between as medium-volume.  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts,
a, from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation
2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols *
and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level, respectively. The sample is from










































Performance-Evaluation Results for Trade-Volume
Decompositions of the day0-day5 Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the day0-day5 purchase and sale
portfolios by trade volume.  The day0-day5 purchase (sale) portfolio includes all shares purchased (sold) by insiders
over the previous five days. To decompose these portfolios by trade volume, we first calculate the percentage of
firm equity traded in each transaction. Next, we sort all trades by these equity percentages, with purchases and sales
ranked separately.   Based on these rankings, we divide purchases and sales into thirds: “low-volume”, “medium-
volume”, and “high-volume”.  This yields cutoffs of 0.004 and 0.028 percent for the purchase thirds, and 0.010 and
0.048 percent for the sales thirds; i.e, all sales below 0.010 percent of firm equity are classified as low-volume,
above 0.048 percent are classified as high-volume, and in-between as medium-volume.  The top of the chart shows
the regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the
4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in
parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level,











































 Firm-Size Decompositions of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and
sale portfolios by firm size. At the beginning of each month, we divide the NYSE into thirds
based on size (market value).  We then use the cutoffs for these thirds to place all
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks into one of three categories: “small-firm”, “medium-firm”, and
“large-firm”.   Each insider transaction is then placed into a portfolio on the day of the trade
based on the size of the firm.  This position stays in the same portfolio for the full year, even if
the underlying firm crosses a size cutoff.  This procedure results in six portfolios (three for
purchases and three for sales).  The top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the
CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model
(equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in
parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and










































Performance-Evaluation Results for Job-Title Decompositions
of the Purchase and Sale Portfolios
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and
sale portfolios by job title of insider.  “Top executives” are the subset of corporate officers that
hold the title of chief executive, chairman of the board, or president.  “Officers” include all
corporate officers except for top executives.  “Directors” are members of the corporate board
who do not also hold an officer title.  These categories do not overlap and cover all trades in our
sample.  This decomposition results in three purchase portfolios and three sale portfolios.  The
top of the chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle
shows the regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom portion
shows the CS measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols * and
** indicate two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level, respectively. The
sample is from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.
Purchase Sale
CAPM








director    0.0044**






























Performance-Evaluation Results for Decompositions of the
Purchase and Sale Portfolios between Direct and Indirect Trades
This table presents the performance-evaluation results for decompositions of the purchase and
sale portfolios between direct and indirect trades.  Securities owned directly are those held in the
reporting person's name.  Securities owned indirectly are those held in the name of another
person in which a reporting person has a pecuniary interest, by reason of any contract,
understanding or relationship (including a family relationship or arrangement).  The top of the
chart shows the regression intercepts, a, from the CAPM (equation 1).  The middle shows the
regression intercepts, a, from the 4-factor model (equation 2).  The bottom portion shows the CS
measure (equation 3).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols * and ** indicate
two-tail significance at the five-percent level and one-percent level, respectively. The sample is
from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1996.
Purchase Sale
CAPM
direct 0.0060**
(0.0016)
-0.0009
(0.0014)
indirect 0.0043*
(0.0019)
-0.0016
(0.0016)
4-Factor Model
direct 0.0051**
(0.0012)
0.0007
(0.0010)
indirect 0.0034*
(0.0016)
-0.0008
(0.0013)
CS Measure
direct 0.0060**
(0.0011)
0.0008
(0.0010)
indirect 0.0031
(0.0018)
-0.0002
(0.0012)